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TORTS - RIGHT OF WAY AT INTERSECTIONS IN LOUISIANA
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
In Louisiana, the problem of who has the right of way1 at
intersections2 is determined by right of way statutes3 or ordi-
nances,4 and by the jurisprudential doctrine of preemption.
Where no other statute or ordinance specifically provides who
shall have the right of way,5 R.S. 32:237A states the general
rule thusly: "When two vehicles approach or enter an inter-
section at approximately the same time, the driver approaching
from the right shall have the right of way. The driver of any
vehicle traveling at an unlawful rate of speed or in an unlaw-
ful manner shall forfeit any right of way he might otherwise
have." Under this provision, the right of way granted is not
1. LA. R.S. 32:1(19) (1950): "'Right-of-way' means the privilege of the im-
mediate use of a highway."
2. LA. R.S. 32:1(9) (1950): "'Intersection' means the area embraced within
the prolongation of the lateral curb lines, or if none then the lateral boundary
lines to two or more highways which join one another at an angle whether or not
such highway crosses the other."
3. The following statutes provide for the designation of through highways:
LA. R.S. 32:239 (1950) : "Whenever the department designates any highway
(over which local authorities have not exercised jurisdiction pursuant to R.S.
32:344) as a through highway and has erected signs at entrances thereto pursuant
to R.S. 32:343, no person shall fail to stop his vehicle in obedience to such signs
when entering or crossing such through highway."
LA. R.S. 32:342 (1950) : "The department is authorized to classify, designate,
and mark both intrastate and interstate highways lying within the boundaries of
this state, and to provide a uniform system of marking and signing the public
highways of this state, and this system shall correlate with, and so far as possible,
conform to the system adopted by the United States and the other states."
LA. R.S. 32:343 (1950) : "The department is authorized to designate main
travelled or through highways by erecting at the entrance thereto from intersect-
ing highways signs notifying drivers of vehicles to come to a full stop before enter-
ing or crossing such highway.
"Whenever such sign has been erected as provided by R.S. 32:239 of this Chap-
ter, it shall be unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to fail to stop in obedience
thereto."
In National Retailers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Harkness, 76 So.2d 95 (La. App.
1954), the court stated that, in the absence of a law, the mere placing of a stop
sign at the intersection of a street will not make the street a right of way or
favored street.
4. The authority for local governing bodies to regulate rights of way is pro-
vided in LA. R.S. 32:344 (1950) : "Local authorities, in their respective jurisdic-
tions, may cause appropriate signs to be erected and maintained, designating resi-
dence and business districts, highways, railway grade crossings, and other signs
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Chapter, or appropriate to give notice
to an ordinarily observant person of local parking and other special regulations.
However, the erection of signs at railway grade crossings shall not relieve travel-
lers or vehicles of the duty to 'stop, look, and listen' before proceeding thereon as
is provided in R.S. 32:243 or other laws of this state."
5. In Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 34 So.2d
796 (La. App. 1948), the court stated that an ordinance, like any other fact, must
be alleged and proved to be considered.
6. LA. R.S. 32:237A (1950) has been applied where travelers of neither street
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absolute and the driver who would avail himself of it remains
under the duty of using reasonable care.7 Nevertheless, he can
assume that others, by proper observation of traffic regulations,
will respect his right of way.8 If he does enter the intersection
the question then arises if he has sufficiently preempted it so
that others must respect his right. This doctrine of preemption,
as it is called, is often used by the courts to allow recovery to a
motorist regardless of whether or not he initially had the right
of way. The courts of Louisiana have developed two divergent
concepts of the meaning of this doctrine.
One concept of the preemption doctrine is that enunciated in
Butler v. O'Neal,9 where the court stated that "pre-emption of
an intersection . . . does not mean the prior entry of a vehicle
simply by a matter of a few feet, or, in relation to the time
element, by a fraction of a second ahead of another vehicle,
but . . . such pre-emption must be construed to mean an entry
into an intersection with the opportunity of clearing the same
without obstruction of the path of another vehicle under nor-
mal and reasonable circumstances and conditions." (Emphasis
added.) A similar concept of preemption was announced by the
court in the recent case of Gauthreaux v. Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Co.,10 where a motorist entered a favored thoroughfare
and was struck in the center of the intersection by one who had
the right of way. The court refused to grant the right of pre-
emption to the driver who blindly entered the favored street
have been given an advantage by ordinance, Lottinger v. Yellow Cab Co. of Shreve-
port, Inc., 75 So.2d 56 '(La. Apli. 1954), even though one intersecting street car-
ries a greater amount of traffic than the other, Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v.
Streater, 6 So.2d 242 (La. App. 1942). The latter case was decided under La.
Acts 1938, No. 286, Title II, § 3, rule 11(a).
7. Wilson v. Yellow Cab Co. of Shreveport, Inc., 64 So.2d 463, 466 (La. App.
1953). The court stated: "But it is strenuously urged by counsel for defendant
that the driver of the cab had the right to rely upon his preferred status due 'to
the fact that he was traveling on a favored or right-of-way street. As has been
many times observed by our courts the superior right which is accorded vehicular
traffic on a preferred thoroughfare is not an invitation to negligence and certainly
it does not relieve drivers from the results of their negligence. On the eontrary
the superior right is forfeited by the negligence of a driver. Among the most com-
mon acts of negligence which are unexcused by such preferred right are excessive
speed and failure to maintain a lookout." Quoted by the court in Hickerson v.
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 77 So.2d 124, 131 (La. App. 1955).
8. Mejheardt v. Reboul, 158 So. 235 (La. App. 1935). In this case, plaintiff,
who had entered an intersection after the light turned green, was struck by de-
fendant, who entered on a red light. In granting recovery, the court stated that
while the right of way accorded a vehicle cannot be exercised in disregard of 'the
course of the other vehicle, the driver on a favored street may assume that other
traffic will respect the traffic regulations and not violate the law.
9. 26 So.2d 753 (La. App. 1946).
10. 83 So.2d 667 (La. App. 1955).
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and who then attmpted to absolve himself of liability simply
because he was there first.1' Both the Butler and Gauthreaux
cases express a preemption doctrine that complements R. S.
32:237A. The statute only determines who has the right to the
"first use" of an intersection when the motorists arrive there
at "approximately the same time." When the motorists arrive
at the intersection at different times, so that it is reasonable to
assume that the one arriving first could traverse the intersection
before the second vehicle reaches it, then the doctrine of pre-
emption governs and the motorist arriving first may proceed
without regard to any preexisting right of way.
A broader concept of the preemption doctrine was announced
in Gauthier v. Fogleman. 2 The court there stated: "It is well
settled that where a collision occurs between two automobiles at
a street intersection, the automobile which first entered the
intersection has the right to proceed, . .. even though the car
entering the intersection secondly in point of time is being
driven on a right of way street." (Emphasis added.) Although
the motorists in that case arrived at the intersection at "ap-
proximately the same time," the court did not apply R.S.
32:237A, but held the defendant liable because his excessive
speed was the proximate cause of the accident. 8 In a 1955 case,
Booth v. Columbia Casualty Co.,' 4 where the defendant was ap-
parently traveling at a lawful rate of speed on a favored street
and where both drivers arrived at the intersection at "approxi-
mately the same time,"' 5 the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed
recovery to the plaintiff under the broad language used in the
11. Id. at 669. The court stated: ". .. it does not appear to us, even if
Gauthreaux [plaintiff] observed Mrs. Barrow failing to stop at the stopsign,
that he had-thus far having proceeded free of negligence and under no duty up
until that time to anticipate the inferior motorist's failure to observe her legal
duty to stop-physical opportunity to avoid the collision." The defendant's entry
into and crossing of the intersection occurred within 1 to 1'/ seconds.
12. 50 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1951).
13. The court also stated that a "right of way is not a right of pre-emption
and vehicles traveling on a favored street may not disregard the rights of other
vehicles by undue insistence upon that right."
14. 227 La. 932, 80 So.2d 869 (1955). In this case, the plaintiff slowed down
and entered a blind intersection at 7 mph. The defendant's garbage truck, ap-
proaching from the right at a speed of approximately 20 mph., struck plaintiff's
car in the middle of the intersection. Testimony of plaintiff taken in the trial
court-74 So.2d 776 (La. App. 1954) -indicated that the street plaintiff was
crossing was 18 feet wide and that the plaintiff had proceeded 4 or 5 feet into the
intersection before becoming cognizant of the defendant's truck.
15. The plaintiff motorist entered the intersection approximately one second
prior to the collision.
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Gauthier case.'6 Under these circumstances, the application of
this rule of preemption nullified, in effect, the provisions of
R.S. 32:237A and displaced the concept of preemption as de-
fined in the Butler case. Since both parties reached the inter-
section at "approximately the same time," it is submitted that
the court should have applied R.S. 32:237A and denied recovery.
The more plausible concept of the doctrine of preemption is
that stated in the Butler and Gauthreaux cases. The concept
stated in the Gauthier and Booth cases is basically in conflict
with Louisiana statutory right of way provisions and would
tend to nullify the important benefits they seek to achieve.
Patsy Jo McDowell
16. The court stated: "The plaintiff having pre-empted the intersection had
the right to proceed and under the well-settled jurisprudence the automobile which
first enters an intersection has the right of way over an approaching automobile
and the driver who does not respect this legal right of the automobile which first
entered the intersection to proceed through in safety, is negligent, even though the
car thereafter entering the intersection is being driven on a right of way street."
Booth v. Columbia Casualty Co., 227 La. 932, 935, 80 So.2d 869, 870 (1955).
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